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ABSTRACT
Cybersecurity researchers have made significant steps to understand the
mechanisms of security policy compliance and unify theories of security behavior.
However, due partly to the limitations of traditional variance model statistical methods,
these studies by necessity typically focus on a single security policy issue. By contrast,
new machine learning algorithms frequently employed by data scientists offer great
promise as a new statistical approach for examining robust individualized interpretations
of policy and can also identify potentially risky behaviors. This study proposes to explore
cybersecurity training impediments of multiple protection motivation behaviors in
ransomware prevention training. It demonstrates the feasibility of using machine learning
with survey items from the cybersecurity research to predict non-compliance. It also
illustrates a potentially novel method to statistically validate research theory through
higher levels of ML prediction. This study is a work in progress and we seek feedback
on its design and relevance.
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INTRODUCTION
Ransomware is currently the most significant organizational malware threat today
(Verizon Enterprise Solutions 2018), suggesting that changing insider behavior to prevent multivector threats is a pressing issue in cybersecurity. In response to such threats, cybersecurity
professionals frequently update recommended best practices for security behavior (e.g. saving
data according to retention rules, verifying legitimate emails, and reporting incidents). When
users do not comply with recommendations it makes them less safe and puts the organization at a
higher security risk. Consequently high participation rates in cybersecurity training to
communicate best security practices is important to protect against sophisticated multi-vector
attacks such as ransomware (D’Arcy et al. 2009; Jensen et al. 2017).
Significant steps have been made to understand the mechanisms of cybersecurity policy
compliance (S. Boss et al. 2015; e.g. , Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Crossler and Belanger 2014; Curry
et al. 2019; Johnston and Warkentin 2010; Siponen et al. 2010). These studies generally assume
a universally applicable security policy rules matched to correct security behaviors. Thus, one
common approach to persuading insiders’ participation in cybersecurity training is the use of fear
appeals.
Cybersecurity research has begun to unify theories of security behavior (e.g. Moody et al.
2018) using familiar statistical methods where inputs are generally tangible and empirically
observable inputs. These and other studies have used traditional variance modeling to validate
behavior-driving constructs assessed through psychometric surveys. By implication, individuals
who have low levels of these identified constructs are more likely to be non-compliers. However,
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machine learning (ML) classifier algorithms employed by data scientists offer great promise as a
new statistical approach to combining theoretical constructs. Furthermore, the use of survey
items as inputs to ML is not uncommon in practice as organizations use opinion surveys or
transaction feedback to guide response protocols. But the use of psychometric items in assessing
or identifying cybersecurity risk in machine learning has not been explored in the research
literature. Therefore the research question we seek to answer is:
RQ: Are items from behavioral information security research practically useful in an ML
context as indicators of the likelihood of non-compliance with recommended security practices?
This study adopts the lens of Posey et al. (2013) who define three dimensions for security
topics to help identify impediments to cybersecurity training, and explores the feasibility of the
use of machine learning (ML) classifier algorithms to process psychometric survey response
items in identifying individuals who are likely to pose elevated levels of non-compliance risk.
We seek to develop a new approach for employing theoretical models that combine behavioral
information security with data science to produce actionable data relationships for improved
cybersecurity behavior.
BACKGROUND
Posey et al. (2013) Identify a taxonomy of protection-motivation behaviors (PMB),
which they define as ‘volitional insider behavior to protect organizational information and
systems from security threats.’ These serve as a broad categorization of representative clusters
for classifying responsible security behaviors. We itemize six behaviors noted by security
professionals as targeting ransomware vectors and their PMB classification (Posey et al. 2013) in
Table 1.
Table 1. Potential Ransomware Prevention Protective-Motivation Behaviors (PMB)
Topic
Attack vector targeted
PMB (Category) from Posey et al.

Proceedings of the 14th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Munich, Germany December 15, 2019.

3

Curry, M., Marshall, B. Crossler, R.E.

Legitimate and Phishing email messages with
Secure e-mail use a malicious attachment or a
link to a payload hosted
elsewhere are a primary
infection source

Secure Software

Reports
incidents

Secure
use of computer software

any A
prompt
organizational
response can minimize the
consequences of ransomware
attack

Saves
information
according
to
retention policy
Changes
password
according
to
guidelines
Backs
up
important data
Mindfulness
while working

Appropriate
storing
of
information per policy may
support backups and limit
sources of malware
Protecting
account
from
becoming
a
source
of
spreading ransomware within
the organization
Having
backups
enables
recovery from ransomware
attack
Being alert and intentional
while at work to avoid careless
behavior that can lead to
insecurity
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(2013)
An organizational insider only responds to
emails which have a legitimate business
request (1)
An organizational insider opens email
attachments only if he/she knows the
email's sender and was expecting the email
(1)
An organizational insider does not open
emails that he/she believes have a chance
of containing a virus or other potentially
malicious components (6).
An organizational insider pauses before
responding to an email to make certain that
he/she is responding to a valid request (6).
An organizational insider immediately
applies software updates to his/her
computer workstation when notified of the
update by an authorized individual or
department within his/her organization (6)
If an organizational insider identifies
something that looks out of the ordinary in
his/her
work
environment,
he/she
immediately reports it to the proper
organizational authorities (3)
An organizational insider
stores
information only according to the retention
policies specified by his/her organization
(3)
An organizational insider changes his/her
passwords
according
to
his/her
organization's security guidelines (3)
An organizational insider backs up
important data and documents on a regular
basis (4)
An organizational insider works at a steady
but cautious pace to ensure that he/she
performs their job tasks in a secure manner
(4)

Posey et al. (2013) also define three dimensions for classifying behavioral topics: the criticality
or importance for all to perform on an ongoing basis; the difficulty promoting ongoing adherence
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due to burden, focus and effort required; and finally the degree of common sense that leads
insiders to naturally understand the logic and rationale. Assessing these three behavioral
dimensions across all five PMBs can offer valuable insights on insiders security policy
expectations (Siponen 2003) and provide clear targets for improving the most important
behaviors for an organization. We posit that low levels of these three behavioral dimensions
across all five PMBs may impact insiders understanding of recommended security behaviors,
their motivation for following those practices and consequently their actual participation in
cybersecurity training. We formalize these in the following hypotheses:
H1: Insiders’ assessment of criticality or importance for all to perform a recommended
PMB on an ongoing basis will impact motivation to adopt.
H2: Insiders’ assessment of difficulty promoting ongoing adherence due to burden, focus
and effort required to perform a recommended PMB will impact motivation to adopt.
H3: Insiders’ assessment of degree of common sense that leads insiders to naturally
understand the logic and rationale to perform a recommended PMB will impact motivation to
adopt.
Adapting the Posey et al. (2013) taxonomy to the challenge of multi PMB initiatives, we
propose to collect data from participants invited to participate in cybersecurity training and
theoretically classify by ransomware vulnerability. Successful strategies for preventing a threat
such as ransomware would be an important methodological contribution to cybersecurity
professionals by addressing a complex multi-vector threat.
Machine Learning
The use of ensemble classifiers such as the random forest or C5.0 algorithms shows
promise in extending cybersecurity research at the organizational level. But the internal logic
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captured in the resulting models is largely opaque (Gopal et al. 2011). Because this relatively
new approach is not widely understood, management may tend to view machine learning as a
‘blackbox’ causing difficulty in making a convincing business case that analytical conclusions
are reliable and actionable (Müller et al. 2016; Ramasubramanian and Singh 2016; Sharma et al.
2014). By contrast, we posit that combining theoretically inspired indicators of cybersecurity
behavior should offer satisfying indicators of likely noncompliance. There is no particular
reason to believe that theoretically validated constructs do not interact in complex ways more
easily discovered using machine learning than commonly liner-regression-based analysis. This
notion is formalized in the following hypothesis.
H4: Using psychometric cybersecurity indicators of PMB attitudes and intentionality will
increase categorization accuracy as compared to explained variance based on regression
analysis methods.
Reducing assessment length by using the ‘best items’
The large number of survey items in research studies often makes the proposed
instrument impractical in an organizational setting. Feature selection techniques are commonly
used to reduce computational cost and increase accuracy in machine-learning classification tasks
involving a high number of indicator variables. Feature selection techniques promise to shorten
surveys while retaining a large portion of indicative power. In the security domain, for example,
Jenkins and Grimes (2014) employed feature selection for keystroke dynamics, e.g., how long
keys are held down and time between key presses, to identify password reuse without actually
recording passwords, and Liu and Yu (2005) note that feature selection plays an important role in
intrusion detection. Ensemble classifiers may be capable of employing complex interactions that
have not been carefully explored in the research literature. These interactions may be ‘captured’
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in the classification model even though the number of assessment items has been reduced using
feature selection. We formalize this in the following hypothesis.
H5: The number of psychometric cybersecurity indicators employed in classification can
be reduced without significantly reducing prediction accuracy.
METHODOLOGY
We propose to collected data from 250 participants, as summarized in Figure 1.

Intro

About
ransom
ware

Assess deviant
Intent (Moody et al.,
2018) plus 1 PMT
item per construct

Assess PMB
attitude
(Posey, 2013)

Scenario Intent
& PMT items

PMB ‐ Email
assessment

Scenario Intent
& PMT items

PMB ‐ Internet
assessment

Scenario Intent
& PMT items

PMB ‐ Reports
assessment

Scenario Intent
& PMT items

PMB ‐ Backup
assessment
PMB ‐ Password
assessment

Scenario Intent
& PMT items

PMB ‐ Mindfulness
assessment

7‐10 day break

Scenario Intent
& PMT items

Multiple
Participates in
sessions of
ransomware
Ransomware
training? ‐the DV
Training

DVs for participation
behavior

Demo‐
graphics

# of Trainings
Completed
Training Test Score
Behavior Self
Reports

Figure 1. Study design to assess PMB attitudes, deviant intentions and ransomware training participation.
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Participants are to be presented with a short motivational introduction about ransomware and the
need for multiple behavior changes. This is followed by presenting six different recommended
PMBs and assessments of attitudes towards each. To assess drivers of intention, a single
protection motivation theory (PMT) (S. R. Boss et al. 2015) indicator for each construct will be
asked over the six behaviors. This can be used to identify which PMBs insiders have difficulty
with following and may also suggest necessary organizational improvements. We plan to
confirm difficulties with the PMB by also assessing deviant intention towards this PMB using
scenarios (Moody et al. 2018; Siponen et al. 2010). Finally we assess participation in the followon ransomware training as a dependent variable (see Appendix A) to classify each insider’s
threat.
Discussion
Guided partly by feature selection computations, this study will explore the ability of a
ML classifier algorithm to categorize potentially risky individuals using a subset of the items
used to assess theoretical drivers of noncompliance. This smaller instrument can also be used by
an organization to evaluate the most problematic areas of security policy compliance, and
identify risky individuals who may also be a higher security risk then target them for additional
treatments or monitoring. This approach charts a path whereby items assessing constructs drawn
from behavioral InfoSec studies may be practically employed as inputs to cybersecurity risk
assessments. The model can also be reused on future data as insiders participate in the security
training.
CONCLUSION
This work in progress seeks to fill the gap in exploring how insiders interpret cybersecurity
policy by using psychometric indicators processed with powerful ML algorithms. This work can
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contribute to the literature by exploring the feasibility of bringing together constructs and items
developed using reliable and familiar theory development techniques with new computational
algorithms. Theoretically validated items that are thought to indicate drivers of behavior may or
may not translate well into practical indicators in a ML context. But if they do, it would have
useful practical implications and may lead to new insights into how security behavior models are
theorized and implemented in the future.
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APPENDIX A – INSTRUMENT
Assessing Attitudes of Protective-Motivation Behaviors
The following items adapted from Posey et al. (2013) employ a bipolar scale
Obvious: How to protect my account with <recommended PMB> is (is not) obvious.
Reasonable standard: Protecting my account with <recommended PMB> is (is not) a
reasonable standard.
My responsibility: Protecting my account with <recommended PMB> is (is not) my
responsibility.
Degree of difficulty: Protecting my account with <recommended PMB> is (is not) difficult to
perform.
Involves a judgement call: Protecting my account with <recommended PMB> does (does not)
involve a judgement call on my part.
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Assessing Deviant Security Behavior Intention Scenarios and Questions
We plan to assess deviant intent to not follow the recommended behavior using scenarios where
users can indicate agreement with a deviant behavior without fear of self-incrimination (Moody
et al. 2018; Siponen et al. 2010). Here are drafts of proposed scenarios
Legitimate and Secure Email Use: Riley is a new employee in a small business and wants to
make a good impression. During Riley’s second week at this job an email message arrives from
the senior manager directing each employee to complete an evaluation by the end of the day.
Riley recognizes the manager’s email address and signature block. Riley knows it might be a
good idea to ask someone else about the email’s authenticity, but decides not to bother anyone
instead. Riley clicks the “Begin Evaluation” link in the email message.
Secure Internet Use: Peyton uses the computers at work to look for vacation deals. Peyton
learns that many experts believe using work computers for non-work activities increases the
likelihood of being attacked by malicious software. Peyton is invited to participate in training at
work to learn more about safe internet usage. Peyton believes this training may be beneficial and
initially agrees to participate. However later Peyton decides not to actually complete the training.
Scenario Reports Potential Ransomware Attack: Blake’s work computer displays a “software
update needed, click to update” message. Blake clicks the update button and the computer
freezes. Blake steps away for a short break. When Blake returns the computer is still not
responding. Blake can’t even get the computer to restart. Blake decides to stop using the
computer until the next day. Despite being aware of a policy to promptly report computer issues
Blake leaves work for the day and does not tell anyone in IT.
Scenario Saves information according to retention policy; Backs up important data: Avery
is on a companywide project. All twelve project members are from a different part of the
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company. Avery takes notes for the project meeting. Avery knows saving information on the
company cloud storage is part of the authorized retention policy. Avery prefers a free internet file
sharing site and uploads the meeting minutes there. Avery then sends an email message to the
other team members with a link to the notes.
Scenario Chooses password according to guidelines: Reese is an employee in the company
with a system account. Reese receives a notification that his password is due to expire and needs
to be changed. Reese clicks on the password reset. Before making a password choice, Reese
reads that sharing a password with another site is not recommended. Reese chooses the same
password that he uses for online banking.
Mindfulness while working: Rory is leaving work for the day and in a hurry. Just as Rory is
about to leave she receives an email from a senior manager asking if she is still available. Rory
realizes that when she is in a hurry there is less time for her to examine an email message and
determine if it is legitimate or a potential source for security threats like ransomware. Although
Rory does not recognize the email address, she decides to reply to the email anyway to tell the
manager to say she is leaving for the day.
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT)
To assess drivers of intention, one PMT question per construct will be asked for each of the six
behaviors, adapted from Boss et al (2015).
PMT Items used to assess drivers of intention. These items use a 7 point Likert scale from
strongly disagree to strongly agree unless otherwise indicated.
Severity: If I were to do what <scenario named individual> did, a serious information security
problem would result.
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Vulnerability: if I were to do what <scenario named individual> did an information security
problem would likely occur.
Fear: I am afraid of what may happen if I were to do what <scenario named individual> did.
Task Self-Efficacy: I can easily follow recommended guidelines for <recommended security
behavior>
Response Efficacy: Information security problems can be reduced by participating in
recommended security behavior training on <recommended security behavior> and following
recommended guidelines.
Intention: I would act in the same way as <scenario named individual> did if I were in the same
situation.
Dependent variables
Multiple indicators will be used to assess actual behavior.


Participation: does participant initiate recommended security training (yes/no)



Number of trainings completed



Training test scores (4-6 questions per PMB block)



Behavior self-reports (‘has your behavior changed…’ type questions)
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